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Introduction
In 1994, Jonathan Ashley-Smith urged the profession to be honest. The topic
was environmental standards for loans and his call to arms was for the pro-
fession to start to ‘tell it like it is’. In the written paper,1 and conference pres-
entation,2 Ashley-Smith and his colleagues challenged some of our dearly
held assumptions about protecting collections, questioned the truthfulness
of our statements, advocated for acknowledging the possibility of not
always having an answer, and asked what it is that the conservation pro-
fession finds it hardest to tell the whole truth about. Some of these points
were further developed in Ashley-Smith’s IIC Melbourne conference paper
on professional uncertainty.3 Prompted by those challenges, this paper
examines three related areas: assumptions about protecting collections; the
relationship between truth with ethics; and professional uncertainty,
before asking why it appears to still be hard for conservators to ‘tell it like
it is’. When considering issues of attitude and behaviour such as assump-
tions and approaches, it is necessary to reflect on something of the psychol-
ogy that influences them. Whilst a complete appraisal of the psychology of
conservators is beyond the scope of this paper, it does suggest that under-
standing changes in behaviour is both central to improving practice and
seriously under-represented in the conservation literature.
Evolving standards
Ashley-Smith and his colleagues asked us to rethink the over-reliance on
narrow humidity ranges in environmental specifications and support any
such requirement first with technical evidence. If this expression of need
was clear in 1994, how far have we come as a profession to effect realistic
environmental targets? The debate has remained current with both the Inter-
national Institute of Conservation (IIC) and the International Council for
Museums—Committee for Conservation (ICOM-CC) coming together to
offer a joint declaration on environmental guidelines. They urge conserva-
tors to consider sustainability and local climate in setting temperature (T)
and relative humidity (RH) parameters, and refer to recommendations
from three documents to be used in appropriate contexts.4 These guidelines
set out more pragmatic loan conditions and offer the most internationally
consolidated opinion since Garry Thomson’s ‘Class 1 standard’ became the
basis for a de facto international standard in 1986.5
It is interesting to look at the progress that has been made in delivering a
more pragmatic and flexible standard for the museum environment as
suggested in the IIC/ICOM-CC declaration by comparing the recommen-
dations of the documents that form its basis (Table 1). In general terms,
the movement within the sector is welcomed but does not radically shift
from Thomson’s recommendations, especially when his Class 2 standard
is considered.6 The outcome in terms of guidelines for humidity and
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1 Jonathan Ashley-Smith, Nick Umney
and David Ford, ‘Let’s be Honest—Rea-
listic Environmental Parameters for
Loaned Objects’, Studies in Conserva-
tion 39, (1994), Issue sup.2: ‘Preprints of
the Contributions to the Ottawa Con-
gress, 12–16 September 1994. Preventive
Conservation: Practice, Theory and
Research’: 28–31, http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/sic.
1994.39.Supplement-2.28? journalCode=
ysic20 (accessed 28 November 2017).
2 Jonathan Ashley-Smith, ‘Let’s be
Honest’ (paper presented at the IIC con-
ference, ‘Preventive Conservation: Prac-
tice, Theory and Research’, Ottawa,
Canada, 15 September 1994), http://cool.
conservation-us.org/byauth/ashleysmith/
honest.html (accessed 28 November
2017).
3 Jonathan Ashley-Smith, ‘Developing
Professional Uncertainty’, Studies in Con-
servation 45, (2000), Issue sup.1: Contri-
butions to the Melbourne Congress, 10–
14 October 2000. ‘Tradition and Inno-
vation: Advances in Conservation 2000’:
14–17, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
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4 The joint ICOM-CC IIC document
includes extracts from documents pro-
duced by the ‘Bizot Group’ (the Inter-
national Group of Organizers of Large-
scale Exhibitions), the Australian Institute
for the Conservation of CulturalMaterials
(AICCM) and the American Institute of
Conservation (AIC), see: http://www.
icom-cc.org/332/-icom-cc-documents/
declaration-on-environmental-
guidelines/ (accessed 28November 2017).
5 The Class 1 standard, as defined by
Thomson, is ‘appropriate for major
national museums, old or new, and also
for all important new museums’: temp-
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temperature management can be seen as much as the eventual acceptance of
a modified Class 2 standard as a reinvention of Thomson’s Class 1.
If honesty is a requirement on the profession, then any critical self-reflec-
tion by the profession might ask why it appears to be so hard and take so
long to agree and implement recommendations for the protection of collec-
tions? What is it that makes the Class 1 figures persist in the minds of man-
agers and allow the Class 2 parameters to be ignored despite their obvious
advantages from pragmatic and sustainability perspectives? It could be
argued that the issue lies less in any correlation of moisture content to rela-
tive humidity and more in the correlation of the term ‘Class 1’ to a sense of
‘prestige’, with the psychology of professionals still a dominant factor even
after the ratification of the IIC ICOM-CC statement. When aiming to pro-
gress professional practice by challenging assumptions about how best to
protect collections, to align truth with ethics and manage uncertainty, the
psychology of professionals is a determining factor.
Assumptions about protecting collections
When examining environmental guidelines, it makes sense to fully under-
stand their overall purpose of protecting collections. To protect collections
conservators give advice that they hope, or believe, will lead to a significant
extension of the useable lives of the objects. One pre-requisite for preventing
damage is to be clear about what damage actually is. In Ashley-Smith’s 1994
IIC presentation he asked whether damage that we cannot see matters?
Examining this from the perspective of light, it can be measured in ‘Just
Noticeable Fades’ or ‘Perceptible Changes’.7 Measurements of degrees of
damage illustrate a distinction between whether an (average) person can
perceive a change or whether change can be detected by other means.
These different measures directly address key concerns in conservation
and ask difficult questions of the profession. What is needed for longevity?
Is it the provision of extended use value or of material stability? How well
and how consistently does the conservation profession define
damage? Understanding the complex relationships involved in defining
damage is one step towards unpicking conservation’s difficult relationship
with ‘truth’.
Monitoring damage or monitoring the environment: a case of attribute
substitution
If damage is defined as ‘any undesirable change of state’ conservators
should be monitoring changes in state.8 Change in an object’s state—
whether desirable or not—is measured as part of condition checking, often
carried out on individual items for a specific purpose such as preparation
for loan. To monitor a whole collection by condition checking is far from
common, arguably unreliable and very resource intensive. Changes-in-
state also correlate to the value of the object. A small scratch on the base
of an archaeological ceramic might have minimal impact on its significance
whereas a small scratch across the face of a renaissance portrait is perceived
Table 1 A comparison between Thomson’s 1986 environmental guidelines with the IIC/ICOM-
CC 2014 recommendations.
Source RH Temperature (°C)
Thomson Class 1 50 or 55±5 19 winter to 24 summer
Bizot 40–60 < ±10% in 24 hours 16–25
AICCM 40–60 15–25
AIC 40–60 15–25
Thomson Class 2 40–70 Reasonably stable.
> 11 to avoid condensation (p. 45)
erature: 19°C (winter) up to 24°C
(summer) with a relative humidity of
50% or 55%±5%. See Garry Thomson,
The Museum Environment, 2nd edn
(London: Butterworth-Heinemann,
1986), 268–9.
6 The Class 2 standard is ‘aimed at
avoiding major dangers whilst keeping
costs and alteration to a minimum, for
example, climate control in historic
houses and churches may have to be
limited to class 2 specifications’—temp-
erature should be ‘reasonably constant’
to stabilise at RH 40–70%. Thomson,
The Museum Environment, 268–9.
7 As suggested in Jonathan Ashley-
Smith, Alan Derbyshire and Boris
Pretzel, ‘Continuing Development of a
Light Policy for the V&A’, in preprints
of the 13th Triennial Meeting, ICOM Com-
mittee for Conservation, Rio de Janiero, 22–
27 September 2002, ed. Roy Vontobel
(London: James & James, 2002), 3–8.
8 See Jonathan Ashley-Smith, ‘Defi-
nitions of Damage’ (talk given in the
session When Conservator and Collections
Meet at theAnnualMeetingof theAssoci-
ation of Art Historians, London, 7–8
April 1995), http://cool.conservation-us.
org/byauth/ashley-smith/damage.html
(accessed 28 November 2017).
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as highly significant. Measures of change-in-state are therefore costly,
complex, potentially unreliable to undertake and relate to a changing base-
line, which, by any definition, is a complex issue.
Yet, with the exception of some monitoring of things such as crack for-
mation, textile distortion and moisture content changes, the vast majority
of monitoring in preventive conservation focusses on collecting environ-
mental data, especially for temperature, relative humidity, light and
pests. Each monitoring process seeks to record environmental vulnerabil-
ities on different conceptual scales: ‘incorrect’ for relative humidity and
temperature can indicate many different conditions; all light fades
organic collections so ‘correct’ targets are set according to a composite of
human needs and an ability to control exposure; and ‘correct’ pest levels
are set at zero.
When examining environmental monitoring data, conservators have tra-
ditionally feared results that suggest that damage is likely, such as a RH fluc-
tuation of greater than 10% in any one day or levels over 65%. This concern is
commonplace in targets, loan agreements and conservation publications.
Replacing a complex question with an easier to answer one is a very
human way to deal with complexity and is described as attribute substitution.9
Attribute substitution is a heuristic that saves time and effort and, as with any
heuristic, there are valid reasons why it is more time and resource efficient to
answer the substituted question. Attribute substitution can be problematic if
the quality of decisions made in answering the simpler question are signifi-
cantly poorer andwhere that loss of quality is disproportionate to any benefits
gained in resources saved. In daily life many people assume that recognisable
brands offer better quality products than un-familiar ones, which is a quick
and effective decision strategy if they can afford either. On the other hand,
choosing a car on the basis of its paint colour scheme might be seen by
many as oversimplifying the decision process.
In preventive conservation, attribute substitution means that an easier to
answer question such as ‘has RH changed by x or exceeded y?’ replaces a
context-rich and complex question such as ‘in this situation will this collec-
tion change in an unacceptable way as a result of this combination of climate
variables?’. If an organisation can afford to deliver the specified RH without
diversion of resources causing a negative impact elsewhere, the attribute
substitution can be considered effective, whereas if the costs of the decision
based on the replacement attribute are unacceptably high then a more
precise focus on the real challenge presented would be more beneficial. A
further issue with attribute substitution is how well any replacement attri-
bute (e.g. RH change) correlates with the original concern (e.g. an unwel-
come change in material state)—if a change in RH leads to no damage
then, by definition, RH change is not the problem yet many professionals
are locked in to monitoring and responding to RH change rather than any
change in an object’s state.
This is such a simple concept and yet it is not one the profession runs well
with. Is this because, as a profession, we are not confident about what
damage is, and by logical inference, what is safe? Figure 1 depicts a graph
a colleague shared from a store in a museum in which she regularly inspects
items and where no accelerated damage can be observed. She notes that
‘guess what … everything appears to be fine’.10 How many professionals
would be prepared to say in public that such conditions are acceptable if
they are not seeing decay at a rate out of proportion to anything in the
collection’s history?
Process control
Much of the damage conservators deal with is the outcome of processes that
conservators largely understand. Indeed, some might argue that damage
9 The concept is described in Daniel Kah-
neman, ‘A Perspective on Judgement and
Choice’, American Psychologist 58, no. 9
(2003): 697–720, http://www2.econ.
iastate.edu/tesfatsi/JudgementAndChoice
.MappingBoundedRationality.DKahne
man2003.pdf (accessed 28 November
2017).
10 Sara Brown, conservator, personal
communication, November 2017.
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can be defined in terms of the processes that cause it, as in ‘damage is a result
of deterioration’. The mechanism by which fluctuating RH changes moisture
content leading to distortion is well described in the literature.11 The comfort
conservation finds in understanding the principle causes of damaging pro-
cesses may explain why it is those factors that are heavily monitored. If
someone is not confident about determining the outcomes of a process
(i.e. the actual damage) it becomes easier to measure and control the
implementation of the process itself. This can be imagined in terms of a con-
servator asking themselves the following: ‘Is my object being damaged in a
way I currently cannot see but someone might be able to detect at some point
in the future with equipment I don’t have?’. With such existential doubt it
appears safer andmore strategic to act in a way that is known to be safe, pro-
fessionally defendable or at least approved by a manager.
Be safe, avoid damage
Damage could be defined by its oppositional conditions, for example, in
terms of what is shown to be safe or unsafe. ‘Known safes’ offer certainty
and, by way of an example, Thomson observed that the paintings from
London’s National Gallery exhibited far less damage when they were
stored during WWII in caves in Wales, such that on their return information
on those conditions, in which no damage occurred, was used to inform
environmental targets for major national museums.12 Working from known
safe conditions might seem to be the logical way to deploy resources,
especially as it gives a sense of adherence to best practice and, on first encoun-
ter, appears to offer a guarantee of safety. Such conditions will inherently
have safety margins or buffer zones, although the necessary size of their tol-
erance may not be known. Any expenditure creates opportunity-costs which
are the unseen consequences of diverted resources such that, for example,
those committed to maintaining unused buffers are now not being spent on
new shelving or training front of house staff to handle collections, meaning
any potential benefits from those actions are never realised.
Fig. 1 Temperature and relative humidity readings over a 12-month period in an archive store at
an unnamed museum.
11 See, for example, Dave Erhardt and
Marion Mecklenburg, ‘Relative Humid-
ity Re-examined’, in Preventive Conserva-
tion: Practice, Theory and Research.
Preprints of the Contributions to the
Ottawa Congress, 12–16 September 1994
(Ottawa: IIC, 1994), 32–8; Stefan
Michalski, ‘Relative Humidity: A Dis-
cussion of Correct/Incorrect Values’, in
ICOM Committee for Conservation Tenth
Triennial Meeting, Washington, DC, 22–
27 August 1993: Preprints (London:
James & James Ltd, 1993), 624–9, http://
www.academia.edu/741937/1993._
Relative_humidity_a_discussion_of_
correct_incorrect_values (accessed 6
December 2017).
12 Thomson, The Museum Environment,
268.
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It is known that people apportion more blame to acts of commission rather
than acts of omission,13 thus there is less personal risk in following patterns
of known safety, even if that practice is suboptimal in that it diverts resources
from their most efficient use. As there is no explicit outcome from known
safe conditions—apart from no damage to items—it makes the act of attri-
bute substitution even more desirable such that processes not outcomes
become the focus of daily practice.14 Overinvesting resources to deliver
unnecessarily generous safety margins may offer the feedback that no
damage is happening due to environmental fluctuations, and it is this feed-
back that reinforces the practice. The consequences, say the lack of a spare
trolley in the store, are not tied to the diversion of resources so that when
an object is dropped in transition the feedback loop does not close on the
over-cautious but expensive decisions made elsewhere.
To operate a ‘known safe’ system efficiently relies on the predictability of
the scale of any damage threat. Much of resource investment in risk manage-
ment is set by benchmarks derived from experience: the number of fires in
similar buildings; high water points in floods; the scale of extreme
weather events, and so on, and then set in normal distribution patterns.
Normal distributions cannot predict—and thus protect—collections from
any extreme ‘Black Swan’ events which otherwise reset the recorded limits
of the scale of any threat.15 Working well with contingency is a matter of
effective risk-management, but we know that human efforts to conceive
risk can be clouded by bias. Bias means that some risks are considered as
being more present and urgent, based on their rarity, severity and locus of
control,16 whilst the likelihood of a chain of small risks and catastrophic
Black Swan events are consistently underestimated.17
Conditions known to cause damage
An alternative to the ‘known safes’are those conditions known not to be safe, or
a ‘known damage’ condition. Stefan Michalski took the debate in this direction
by pointing to ‘evidence of the link between change in environment and
changes in objects or materials’, by testing materials to their detectable
limits.18 As Michalski points out, one challenge for defining a ‘known
damage’ is whether a repetition of exposure to conditions that are known to
have caused damage in the past would cause repetition of the damage.
Indeed, one thing we might assume is that past damage in some sense
‘proofs’ collections from future damage.19 Accordingly, a ‘known damage’ con-
dition for a collection in situ will be any condition necessarily worse than pre-
viously experienced, although a prediction of how much worse this will be to
cause damage is not precisely determined by the previous worst case. Such
margins of tolerance are harder to define across complex collections which, in
practice, often leads to any past extremes becoming the limit defining what is
assumed as the now ‘known safe’ conditions. Conditions known to have
caused damage present the conservator with exactly the same challenges as
those with ‘known safe’ conditions. As such, the challenges of attribute substi-
tution, process control and bias in assessment of risk all apply.
The public’s view on damage
As part of a 2015 collections demography project, the public were asked
what they consider to be unacceptable change and how long they expect
things to last.20 From the data there was some consistency with other
research on people’s expectations of what preservation means in that they
tend to think in terms of being able to use something over generations: most
respondents chose ‘survival horizons’ of 50, 100, 200 or 500 years.21 What
was interesting and perhaps surprising was that the public took how long
something has already survived as a benchmark for its future survival: ‘respon-
dents tended to want older documents to last further into the future’.22 Thus a
13 Cf. Jonathan Baron and Ilana Ritov,
‘Omission Bias, Individual Differences,
and Normality’, Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes 94, no. 2
(2004): 74–85.
14 Cf. Rob Waller and Stephan
Michalski, ‘A Paradigm Shift for Preven-
tive Conservation, and Software Tool to
Facilitate the Transition’, in preprints of
the ICOM 14th Triennial Meeting, The
Hague, 12–16 September 2005, Vol. II
(London: James & James, 2005), 733–8.
15 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black
Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
(New York: Random House, 2007).
16 See, for example, Jonathan Ashley-
Smith, Risk Assessment for Object Conser-
vation (London: Butterworth-Heine-
mann, 1999), 281–2; and Paul Slovic,
‘Risk Perception and Affect: Current
Directions’, Psychological Science 15, no.
6 (2006): 322–5.
17 See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast
and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2011).
18 The quotation is from Ashley-Smith,
‘Let’s be Honest’.
19 Stefan Michalski, ‘The Ideal Climate,
Risk Management, the ASHRAE
Chapter, Proofed Fluctuations, and
Toward a Full RiskAnalysisModel’ (con-
tribution to the Getty Conservation Insti-
tute Experts’ Roundtable on Sustainable
Climate Management Strategies, April
2007, Tenerife, Spain), http://www.getty.
edu/conservation/our_projects/science/
climate/paper_michalski.pdf (accessed
28 November 2017).
20 For details of the project, Collections
Demography—On Dynamic Evolution of
Populations of Objects, see https://www.
ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/heritage/research/
projects/project-archive/collections-
demography-dynamic-evolution-
populations-objects (accessed 28
November 2017). For a discussion of
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quite complex set of values seem to be at play: for example, when asked about
perceptions of damage to books the public did not seem to mind the odd fade,
crease or tear so long as they can still read the page. This suggests the public has
a functional regard to value, at least in this context, in contrast to the more
prevalent conservation approach of accumulating any instance of damage
and attempting to aggregate its ‘score’ against an item’s totality or most signifi-
cant value or feature.23
The profession has made some progress in understanding what the public
consider as ‘damage’. Is it therefore the case that the best way to define
damage is simply to reflect public concerns? If so what would the conse-
quences be for the profession in prioritising an item’s use-value over its con-
dition and managing collections on the premise that the longer something
has survived the longer it should continue to do so? Conceptions of
damage that reflect anything other than a simple material change in state
require a full engagement with ‘value’ in terms of scales of significance
and use and incorporating multiple human perspectives including any obli-
gations to the past as well as any consequences for the future. Any such dis-
cussion, although informed by understanding of material change, clearly
hinges on understandings of social values and adds another dimension of
human study required for conservators to fully explore their goals and pri-
orities for protecting collections.
Polarities of damage
There are other conceptions of damage and protection that are used within
the sector. Some attempt to balance competing priorities such as of current
and future user’s needs and may do this by offering a defined (‘acceptable’)
rate of decay. Some are shaped by what is possible, for example, what is
‘technically possible in terms of control’,24 or what the public believe to be
possible in terms of what they can reasonably expect a museum to offer.
There are even some that deal with the impossible by engaging in futile
but energy intensive attempts to prevent entropy. When considering risk
management in terms of public expectation the dual conditions of how
much change has happened and how the public evaluates that change
must be considered to make policy that satisfies expectations. Adding in
the needs of future generations requires the sociological study of interge-
nerational equity.
The setting of appropriate standards requires the sense of what is
damage and what constitutes protection against damage to be clarified,
and this article has so far discussed several concepts that could be used
as a baseline, as indicated in Table 2, which lists different approaches to
defining damage with their mirrored implications for what it means to
protect collections. In the spirit of Ashley-Smith’s exhortation to examine
dearly held assumptions, an examination of the many different meanings
implied in concepts of damage and protection exposes inconsistency.
Although some in the profession may not believe there is a problem in
defining damage or protection—because the concepts are either self-
evident or covered by a preferred option—in reality, every time a different
modality of damage or protection is used, there are distinct and different
consequences for conservation. Each definition impacts decision-making,
resource investment, risk management and has outcomes for users that
present different trajectories. As a minimum, conservators should learn
to express which modality of damage or protection they are considering
when acting to protect collections.
The conservation sector has many able scientists who can offer excellent
methods for measuring changes in state,25 however, even with this knowl-
edge, there is no universally accepted understanding of damage. Damage
is as much a social construct as a physical outcome. So, whilst the sector
‘use value’ see Catherine Dillon, William
Lindsay, Joel Taylor, Kalliopi Fouseki,
Nancy Bell andMatija Strlič, ‘Collections
Demography: Stakeholders’ Views on
the Lifetime of Collections’, in Climate
for Collections Standards and Uncertainties,
ed. Jonathan Ashley-Smith, Andreas
Burmester and Melanie Eibl (London:
Archetype Publications Ltd, 2013), 45–
58.
21 See, for example the paper on the
views of museum professionals by
William Lindsay, ‘Time Perspectives:
What “The Future” Means to Museum
Professionals in Collections-care’, The Con-
servator 29 (2005): 51–61.
22 Dillon et al., ‘Collections Demogra-
phy’, 54.
23 Cf. Joel Taylor, ‘An Integrated
Approach to Risk Assessment and Con-
dition Surveys’, Journal of the American
Institute for Conservation 44 (2005): 127–41.
24 Ashley-Smith, ‘Let’s be Honest’.
25 For example, see this paper from a
series of studies which link material con-
dition to value assessment: Matija Strlič,
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has operated with the underlying assumption that it is the ability to describe
changes in state that leads to progress in protecting collections, in practice it
is also the ability to engage with corporate, social or political priorities that is
equally essential to such ‘progress’. If challenging assumptions is an
essentially human activity then it follows that the truthfulness by which
those assumptions are described must also be governed by psychological
factors.
Truthfulness: can it be ethical to lie?
Ashley-Smith identified a scale of motivations for a person to lie—whether
personally or on behalf of an institution—where at best it is done as a means
to an end, and at worst, to hide their own ignorance.26
Beginning with the more defendable position can, or even should, a con-
servator lie as a means to an end? In the UK Institute of Conservation’s (Icon)
Code of Practice there is no specific mention of lying, although there is clear
indication that professionals need to act within the law, treat others fairly,
document and disclose. There is also the imperative to ‘strive to conserve
cultural heritage so that it can be continued to be used for education and
enjoyment, as reliable evidence of the past and as a resource for future
study’.27 An imaginative conservator may find room to manoeuvre here
and feel justified in offering precautionary advice that they believe will
create safe conditions even when they do not know for certain that failure
to follow their advice would see the perceived threat materialise. In contrast,
the American Institute of Conservation’s (AIC) Code of Ethics makes a very
clear statement on the topic of lying: ‘the conservation professional shall act
with honesty and respect in all professional relationships’, and this is as pro-
minent as the requirement to endeavour to ‘limit damage or deterioration to
cultural property’.28 What happens if those commands conflict, how are they
to be arbitrated and who decides? A thought experiment illustrates this
dilemma. Imagine a conservator facilitating the loan of an important
object and who examines the environmental conditions in a potential host
museum and finds them significantly outside the normal international
benchmarks for loans. If the conservator has no evidence that these con-
ditions will damage their object should they say they might? The conserva-
tor is liaising with the marketing team who are setting up an extravagant
world tour and there is much enthusiasm for the project and the conservator
believes that any nuance will not be well received. If, in order to limit
damage and communicate clearly, they state categorically that these con-
ditions would cause damage, is it really a lie? Well yes, but is it unethical?
In this instance the conservator may conclude that their action to protect
the cultural property is entirely in line with their abiding ethical code.
Any uncertainty about outcomes from poor conditions can be ignored as cer-
tainty will only materialise when damage occurs which self-evidently fails
the ethical code. The requirement to ‘limit damage’ is a far broader
mandate than to ‘act with honesty’ in a sector where uncertainty is built in.
‘High other benefit’ and ‘poor influence’ techniques
Situations where a person arguing for a particular outcome believes that
their influence will generate benefits for others can be described as acting
for a ‘high other benefit’.29 This might be considered when advocating
for children, animals or collections. In these situations, the persuader is
not arguing from a perspective of improving something for themselves
and this describes most of the ways in which conservators attempt to
exert their influence. Alarmingly, research suggests that in such ‘high
other benefit’ situations people show a greater willingness to ignore inef-
fective or unacceptable aspects of their influence and will be ‘more
Carlota Grossi-Sampedro, Catherine
Dillon, Nancy Bell, Kalliopi Fouseki,
Peter Brimblecombe, Eva Menart,
Kostas Ntanos, William Lindsay, David
Thickett, Fenella France and Gerrit De
Bruin, ‘Damage Function for Historic
Paper. Part II: Wear and Tear’, Heritage
Science 3, no. 36 (2015), https://
heritagesciencejournal.springeropen.
com/articles/10.1186/s40494-015-0065-y
(accessed 28 November 2017).
26 Ashley-Smith, ‘Let’s be Honest’.
27 The Institute of Conservation’s Code
of Conduct, 2014, http://icon.org.uk/
system/files/documents/icon_code_of_
conduct.pdf (accessed 28 November
2017).
28 American Institute of Conservation,
Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Practice,
http://www.conservation-us.org/our-
organizations/association-(aic)/
governance/code-of-ethics-and-
guidelines-for-practice (accessed 28
November 2017).
29 Cf. Franklin Boster, ‘Commentary on
Compliance GainingMessage Behaviour
Research’, in Communication and Social
Influence Processes, ed. Charles R. Berger
and Michael Burgoon (East Lansing,
MI: Michigan State University Press,
1995), 91–114.
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aggressive and persistent in their compliance-gaining attempts’.30 This is
a third motivation for lying, and one neither for personal nor insti-
tutional gain, but on behalf of the objects, as the conservator designates
themselves as ‘giving voice’ to the objects’ needs. Where demands to
meet tight environmental conditions in a loan recipient institution not
actually in place in the lending institution might be expected to create
an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance, with the high other benefit
motivation in mind, this can be comfortably reprocessed as being an
altruistic act made by the conservator on behalf and for the sake of
the objects.
When advocacy in ‘high other benefits’ is unsuccessful, the persuadermight
feel justified in simply ramping up their strategies without reference to ethical
codes. Indeed, such is the belief in ‘high other benefits’ that they can go so far
as to convince themselves ‘of the righteousness of inhuman behaviour’.31
Those with significant experience in the heritage world will perhaps be able
to recall their own examples of the sometimes overzealous communication
by conservators when advocating for collection care and how this has
raised barriers to communication rather than facilitating an exchange. Such
psychological insight into the tendency to systematic bias in people’s self-per-
ception, especially where the beneficiaries from the argument are deemed to
be ‘other’, such as a collection, perhaps help explain something of the chal-
lenge conservators face in equitably appraising conditions of ‘known safe’
and ‘known damage’.
Value conflicts
Although professional codes of ethics urge conservators to operate hon-
estly or at least within the law, it is the conservator who navigates any
potential conflict between getting what is ‘best for the object’ with the
exhortation for ‘full and honest disclosure’. Icon’s professional standards
address this, noting that the professional conservator, ‘is able to handle
value conflicts and ethical dilemmas in a manner which maintains the
interests of cultural heritage’.32 Does this help tip the balance in favour
of protecting collections over full and entirely honest disclosure? The pro-
blems associated with ‘high other benefit’ thinking suggest that when
advocating for collections, conservators can become wilfully blind to
their own poor influence technique. This, in turn, makes it impossible
for the conservator to identify their own unacceptable behaviour and to
effectively navigate value conflicts, thereby confirming the assertion that
‘the conservator can never be wrong’.33
On the other hand, where lies are being told not to protect collections
but to protect the conservator’s ego, then the ‘high other benefit’ excuse
Table 2 Polarities of damage and protection.
Vulnerable to damage Protected
Outside of known safe limits Inside known safe limits
Inside known damage parameters Outside known damage parameters
Uncontrolled conditions Controlled conditions
Inadequate resources for control Sufficient resources for control
Conditions out of line with policy
commitments
Conditions in line with policy commitments
Perceptible change No perceptible change
Measurable change Non-measurable change
Unacceptable change in state Acceptable change in state
Decaying faster than a rate set by policy Decaying at or slower than a rate set by policy
Survival less than an agreed collection lifetime Survival of at least an agreed collection
lifetime
Unfair intergenerational distribution of
resources
Fair intergenerational distribution of
resources
30 Boster, ‘Commentary on Compli-
ance’, 102.
31 Boster, ‘Commentary on Compli-
ance’, 103.
32 Cf. Icon’s Professional Standards:
Professional Judgement and Ethics,
http://icon.org.uk/system/files/
documents/professional-standards-
2016.pdf (accessed 28 November 2017).
33 Ashley-Smith, ‘Let’s be Honest’.
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disappears and is replaced by some internalised reward of disguising ignor-
ance and being relieved of the responsibility of resolving it. Some pro-
fessionals might admit at the end of a long night or a long career to
underhand dealing such as fixing the arm of the thermo-hygrograph with
blu-tack or editing out extreme data points from data logger’s spread sheet.34
For the most part such confessions will be rare as they require a degree of
self-awareness almost always limited to informal and non-public spheres. In
most cases any such dishonesty will be rationalised to avoid cognitive disso-
nance with the justification that the lie was for a good cause.
Truth and lies: the case for suboptimal behaviour
‘Freethinkers are those who are willing to use their minds without prejudice and
without fearing to understand things that clash with their own customs, privi-
leges, or beliefs. This state of mind is not common but it is essential for right
thinking … .’ (Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace)
Ashley-Smith suggests in ‘Let’s be Honest’ that the conservation profession
had become locked into a pattern of behaviour of not asking and not telling,
in which one side is ‘economical with the truth’and the other agrees to main-
tain an illusion, by turning a ‘blind eye’. The entire shared acceptance is
described as ‘a game where both sides can win and nobody gets hurt’.35
From the gauge of train track to the use of the Qwerty keyboard, there
may be many examples in life where there is potentially a better way to
operate but the cost of changing is too much for a system to bear in the
short term. As a result, the community continues to invest in and embed sub-
optimal practices. Behaviours that are suboptimal but continue to operate
because the cost of changing direction is deemed too high are known as
‘locked in’. Costs of change can be emotional as well as resource-based.
For museums the cost of changing environmental standards can be related
both to the already-sunk financial cost made concrete in the installation
and operation of air conditioning systems to deliver the magic environ-
mental numbers as well as the emotional costs or the risk of ‘loss of face’
from the admission that such targets have never been necessary.36 This
would mean that what went before was, at best, unnecessary and, at
worst, wrong. To break out of patterns of conformity requires a non-confor-
mist or anti-conformist who is prepared to advocate a different point of
view.37 If the non-conformist is able to influence others in their networks
and is sufficiently well connected, this can lead to a break down in the old
order and allow the emergence of a new idea or technology. Any such
change, even from the suboptimal to the preferable, requires a change-
agent—perhaps even a ‘gun for hire’—to influence its networks. Although
conservators may like to imagine that the basis for decision-making in the
sector is about optimisation in a process of maximising utility, this is not
the only decision-making mode.38 Other forms of decision-making exist
and an awareness of this might help understand how agents inspire
change in those around them. In a locked-in situation such as a de facto stan-
dard that is unnecessarily tight, the cost of change, at least in the short term,
will be higher than the cost of maintaining the status quo.39 An investment
for change will necessarily include investing in some form of psychological
protection to avoid the embarrassment of any ‘u-turn’ or ‘climb-down’ by
those who must effect change to their original specifications.
For conservators to engage in more truth-telling they must do more than
gather truths. Themanagement of the experience of telling truths, of smooth-
ing the psychological and resource-based barriers to change and protecting
egos must all be considered. These challenges also assume that there is a
truth to tell—examining professional uncertainty may help to expose
where that is not the case.
34 The examples are from anonymous
correspondents.
35 Ashley-Smith, ‘Let’s be Honest’.
36 See, for example, James P. Dillard,
‘The Nature and Substance of Goals in
Tactical Communication’, in The Psychol-
ogy of Tactical Communication, ed.
Michael J. Cody and Margaret
McLaughlin (Clevedon, England: Multi-
lingual Matters Ltd, 1990), 70–90.
37 Lex Hoogduin 2016. Decision
Making in a Complex and Uncertain
World “https://protect-us.mimecast.com/
s/vzN0CQWNOwhkkAlyyukKDnB?
domain=rug.nl” http://www.rug.nl/e-
learning/projecten/mooc/complexity-
uncertainty?lang=en (accessed on 21/01/
2018).
38 Cf. Jane Henderson and Robert
Waller, ‘Effective Preservation Decision
Strategies’, Studies in Conservation 61,
no. 6 (2016): 308–23.
39 Cf. Jane Henderson and Shumeng
Dai, ‘Towards a Common Understand-
ing of Standards?’, in Ashley-Smith, Bur-
mester and Eibl, Climate for Collections
Standards and Uncertainties, 11–24.
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Professional uncertainty
Within the murky domain of truth and lies it is the unknown that is hard to
manage: those tricky Schrödinger-like facts. Icon’s Code of Ethics states that
the professional must be honest about what they don’t know: ‘you must be
aware of and acknowledge your limits of understanding and ability’. Is
the profession honest about what we cannot do, the things that fail and
what we don’t know? To manage the limits of understanding we must
find a way to manage professional uncertainty.40
1 Cannot do
Within commonly applied museum standards conservators are challenged to
ensure the care of everything a museum collects.41 This codifies the require-
ment of care, although the concept of protection remains multi-dimensional.
The pragmatic caring principle of ‘this decay is at a rate that I deem accepta-
ble’ is embedded in common conservation practice such as in budgeting for
lighting. The rate is framed by principles that set preservation timetables in
terms of generations. For example, is the profession able to predict the
‘expected collection lifetime’ for complex collections as set out in the BSI spe-
cification for managing environmental conditions?42 Whilst parts of the pro-
fession, such as those working with industrial and contemporary art
collections, do engage in discussions about operational lifetimes, this appar-
ently sensible mandate does not appear to have taken hold in the sector as
a whole, perhaps simply because it is something that the sector cannot do.
More fundamental is how the profession behaves when the lifetime of
something is measured in timescales of less than a generation? How often
are conservators honest in admitting that they cannot preserve some
materials and constructions in timespans of generations? Considering
modern materials such as plastics, honesty about current limitations in prac-
tice and options for intervention means that ensuring preservation for only a
few years is the maximum lifetime that can—or should—be expected.43 If
the expectation of preservation is always centred on the present generation
passing objects forward to future generations, then preservation becomes an
infinite regress and an impossible task.
2 Failure
How honest is the profession about the failure to preserve or about those
projects that don’t work or deliver considerably fewer benefits than pre-
dicted? For conservation where there are a plethora of reports of successful
interventions there is also an absence of reports on projects that were not so
successful. Failure to report can range from the benign, where nothing much
happened, to the concerning, where an object was damaged but not
admitted in public. There has been at least one attempt to gather lessons
from failures in the profession, but other than the publication of the series
Recent Setbacks in Conservation from 1985 to 2001, few such bold acts have
been repeated.44 Within the heritage sector the lack of admission of failure
is seen as a barrier to innovation, yet while professionals agree on the
value of learning from failure, few offer actual examples and the solution
is often to keep failures to private exchanges and successes in print.45
Beyond the specifics of conservation as a discipline, academic writing is
beset by institutional targets that reward only paradigm shifting and inter-
nationally significant outputs.46 This means that repeat studies, reports of
inconclusive outcomes and downright failures have no value in a ‘points-
mean-prizes’ academic culture.47 Academics researching conservation ques-
tions must deliver impact under a rewards-based regime and publish in high
impact journals read by almost none of the profession. Journals achieve high
impact because they are read and cited extensively and as it is a specialist
field, conservation literature can never compete.48 Conservation literature,
40 Joel Taylor, ‘In the Quest for Cer-
tainty: Tensions from Cause-and-Effect
Deductions in Preventive Conservation’,
Journal of the Institute of Conservation 41,
no. 1 (2018): 16–31.
41 Cf. the Arts Council England 2004
Accreditation Collections Development
Policy Template, http://www.
artscouncil.org.uk/what-we-do/
supporting-museums/accreditation-
scheme/ (accessed 24 December 2017).
42 Cf. British Standards Institute, PAS
198: 2012 Specifications for Managing
Environmental Conditions for Cultural
Collections.
43 See, for example, the recorded discus-
sion on The CWord Podcast S02E06: Repli-
cas, Surrogates, and Digitisation,
published by The C-Word, a UK-based
independent conservation forum, http://
thecword.show/2017/11/01/s02e06-
replicas-surrogates-and-digitisation/
(accessed 24 November 2017).
44 See Volumes 1–7, Recent Setbacks in
Conservation (Ottawa: International Insti-
tute for Conservation-Canadian Group,
1985–2001). One example is found in a
recent article that describes how failure
informed a successful treatment:
Christa Gerdwinkler, ‘Consolidation of
a Sepiolite-rich Sandstone—Learning
from Failure’, Journal of the Institute of
Conservation 39, no. 2 (2016): 110–8,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.
1080/19455224.2016.1210016 (accessed
27 December 2017).
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even if read by every single professional, can never have a readership of
more than tens of thousands and citations of even the most influential
papers will barely reach double figures.49 Reporting failure becomes a
thankless task and practitioners perhaps risk their career if they were to
do so. There are few rewards to be had in sharing failures despite its poten-
tial benefit to the collective. This is a suboptimal construction that can only
be overcome by a collective commitment to protecting individuals who do
come forward and share lessons from failure with the group.
Conservation intervention is often high risk, permanent and irreversible
which can be problematic given that the meaning of the objects conserva-
tors seek to preserve have no such permanence nor singularity.50 Preven-
tive conservation is no exception to this: setting target conditions, selecting
materials for inclusion in showcases or managing levels of access all fall
under the remit of preventive conservation but if misjudged can lead to
permanent and irreversible change. Where there has been a call for the
profession to offer the collective opportunity to learn from failures, its
authors point out that other professionals in high-stake roles share
errors via no-blame reporting schemes and that these are used to drive
up standards and quality.51 In discussing why this does not happen in
conservation they note that the profession has ‘paid little attention to
the cognitive patterns and limitations of conservators themselves’.
Added to dealing with the challenge of complexity that is built into collec-
tions with huge diversity of materials, condition and significance, risks
can never be fully understood and this can either be considered as
failure or can be accepted as an unavoidable component of professional
uncertainty.
3 Don’t know
Are conservation practices evidence-based? Do conservators fully under-
stand the consequences of the decisions that they make and is it even
reasonable to expect them to? Practitioners may look to those with time
for research for answers but this requires clear lines of communication
between practitioners and researchers. Conservation scientists predomi-
nantly offer a reductionist approach to objects where their understanding
of what an object means is based upon their ability to analyse it scientifi-
cally. This makes sense as a focus but if that focus anticipates that an
object can be fully understood technically it creates a dislocation
between the materials scientist, their conservation colleagues and the
public. Poor communication will result in a lack of mutual understanding
between researchers who deal in precision and control and practitioners
operating in a world with significant variability and uncertainty. What
is argued here is that there is the additional challenge of ensuring that
conservation research also engages with the complex psychological chal-
lenges in the sector.
To improve communication both sides must be able to access each other’s
work, yet many practitioners do not have access to the high impact factor
journals in which researchers are encouraged by academic institutions to
publish. There is little chance for practitioners to discover research in jour-
nals beyond their horizon or their budget. If we have learnt anything from
the last 25 years it is that such approaches lead to a widening gap
between the science researchers and conservation practitioners, with the
latter in danger of being driven down to the role of routine housekeeping
and procedural driven data collection.
Professional uncertainty is far more than a ‘to do list’ or a research
programme. It requires both the infrastructure and the personal
commitment to examine the ‘cognitive patterns’ of professionals and to
make it an essential facet of our research culture.
45 See for example the @heritagechat
‘Twitter’ feed on 16 November 2017,
‘Innovation and Entrepreneurship in
the Heritage Sector—Are We Doing
Enough?, broadcast by the UK’s ‘Heri-
tage 2020’ group, an alliance of conser-
vation agencies. As part of the feed the
question was asked ‘should we do
more to promote and celebrate failure
in order to encourage calculated risk-
taking and innovation?’. The feed,
including responses to the question, is
archived on https://storify.com/
HeritageChat/innovation-and-
entrepreneurship (accessed 24 Novem-
ber 2017).
46 See for example the guidelines for the
UK’s Research Excellence Framework
(REF), launched in 2014 as a ‘new
system for assessing the quality of
research in UK higher education insti-
tutions’, http://www.ref.ac.uk/2014/
(accessed 28 November 2017).
47 See, for example, psychologist Jon
Sutton interviewing Professor of Biologi-
cal Psychology Marcus Munafò, ‘There’s
This Conspiracy of Silence Around How
Science Really Works’, The Psychologist
30, (2017): 36–9, https://thepsychologist.
bps.org.uk/volume-30/december-2017/
theres-conspiracy-silence-around-how-
science-really-works? (accessed 24
December 2017).
48 For example, the Journal Impact
Factor for Studies in Conservation is
0.578 which compares unfavourably
with the influential science journal
Nature (40.13), or journals servicing
larger professional cohorts such as, for
example, Corrosion Science (5.245).
49 Cf. the metrics for Ashley-Smith,
Umney and Ford, ‘Let’s be Honest’
with seven citations and Ashley-Smith’s
free-to-view 2016 article ‘Losing the
Edge: The Risk of a Decline in Practical
Conservation Skills’, which has 38 cita-
tions: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
citedby/10.1179/sic.1994.39.Supplement-
2.28?scroll=top&needAccess=
true#metrics-content, http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/
19455224.2016.1210015?scroll=
top&needAccess=true#metrics-content
(both accessed 28 November 2017).
50 Cf. Jane Henderson and Tanya Naka-
moto, ‘Dialogue in Conservation
Decision Making’, Studies in Conservation
61, no. Supplement 2 (2016): 67–78.
51 Michele Marincola and Sarah Maisey,
‘To Err is Human: Understanding and
Sharing Mistakes in Conservation Prac-
tice’, in ICOM-CC 16th Triennial Confer-
ence Preprints, Lisbon, 19–23 September
2011, ed. Janet Bridgland (Almada: Cri-
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Challenges for the future
If Ashley-Smith’s original exhortation to ‘tell it like it is’ is complex, its
general thrust that we should offer honest assessment remains as valid
and important today, and so what aspects of contemporary practice might
bear such scrutiny?
1 Fluctuations
One challenge the profession could face head-on is the concern with
environmental fluctuations. Whilst small fluctuations may seem safer
than large ones (even around a floating set point), demanding strict
environmental controls creates an inherently vulnerable system reliant
on large pieces of equipment with a high energy consumption. Whilst
flat lines can be maintained for a convincing time, and certainly long
enough to collect impressive enough data sets, this cannot offer a cast
iron guarantee for similar delivery over decades. A single power failure,
or delay in procedure or maintenance, will see the system halt with a con-
sequent large and un-precedented spike or discrepancy. Ideally a holistic
building system should be conceived with wider tolerances where fluctu-
ations are considered acceptable. This would allow for a more natural
passive system that gradually changes with external conditions or internal
load.52 Such a system, if subject to massive failure, is less distanced from
its initial conditions and so any resultant changes will be less dramatic.
Allowing small doses of unpredictability can enhance the ability of a
system to cope with the unexpected, and has been described as having
‘antifragility’.53
Telling it like it is would apply to the longitudinal time-based conse-
quences of our specifications. When quoting targets and ranges for design
conditions, conservators should also state over how many decades or gener-
ations they expect any degree of consistency to apply. In addition to par-
ameters, tolerances, ranges and design conditions, environmental
specifications should offer a clear statement about how long they should
be effective for. Such information might provide a valuable insight for engin-
eers to understand our comparatively unusual expectations and place con-
sistency on a more even footing with stability and set points. It would
begin to manifest more concretely the profession’s general desire to hand
things from generation to generation within the framework of the operating
systems being installed to deliver this. No plant can realistically deliver
reliability over generations so setting the expectation would return the
focus to a more holistic system approach where mechanical solutions are
only one strand in environmental control, integrated with building design
and operating systems.
2 Focus
The things that people discuss become the focus of thoughts and conse-
quently actions. When the discussion about protecting collections is about
responses to changes in relative humidity this becomes a focus of practice.
In reality much damage in museums happens through careless handling,
but because it is not very interesting to talk about, it rarely features in the
literature. English Heritage conducted an extensive survey of their collec-
tions and found that the two highest risks were: (a) display and storage con-
ditions and (b) dust, dirt and handling.54 Mitigation activities for the display
and storage related to physical protection such as repacking and protecting
furniture during events. Patterns of damage such as handlers dropping an
object are experienced as stochastic, that is, unpredictable events. Diagnosis
of the cause is often neglect, lack of concentration or the absence of the
‘common’ from ‘common sense’, and mitigation of such prosaic occurrences
are hard to elevate into academic publication. As a profession there is a
tério, 2011), http://www.academia.edu/
3430267/To_Err_is_Human_
Understanding_and_Sharing_Mistakes_
in_Conservation_Practice (accessed 28
November 2017).
52 Denmark-based conservators Tim
Padfield and his colleagues have cham-
pioned such an approach in, for
example, Tim Padfield, Poul Klenz
Larsen, Lars Aasbjerg Jensen and
Morten Ryhl-Svendsen, ‘The Potential
and Limits for Passive Air Conditioning
of Museums, Stores and Archives’, in
Museum Microclimate (contributions to
the 2007 Museum Microclimate confer-
ence, Copenhagen, November 2007),
ed. Tim Padfield and Karen Borchersen
(Copenhagen: National Museum of
Denmark, 2007), 191–8, http://www.
conservationphysics.org/musmic/
musmicbuf.pdf; and Tim Padfield,
‘Simple Climate Control in Archives is
Hindered by Too Strict Standards’, in
Proceedings of the 8th Symposium on Build-
ing Physics in the Nordic Countries
(Copenhagen: Technical University of
Denmark, 2008), 14–29, http://www.
conservationphysics.org/ppubs/simple_
archives.pdf (both accessed 28 Novem-
ber 2017).
53 See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifra-
gile: Things that Gain from Disorder
(New York: Random House, 2013).
54 See Amber Xavier-Rowe and Claire
Fry, ‘Heritage Collections at Risk:
English Heritage Collections Risk and
Condition Audit’, in Bridgland, ICOM-
CC 16th Triennial Conference Preprints,
http://icom-cc-publications-online.org/
PublicationDetail.aspx?cid=3d0e5029-
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challenge to investigate and discuss the things that do damage and not just
that which makes good graphs, talks or publications.
Conclusion
Conservation involves a set of challenges around protecting collections that
have been recognised for decades. Progress has been made, but there is no
automatic transmission from finding a correlation between environmental
conditions and changes to the collection to the decisions being made
about environmental conditions in institutions. There is not a well-estab-
lished link between knowledge and practice. As a profession, our research
tends towards material science and our practice towards process control.
Materials science research provides vital evidence for decision-making but
hard facts only take things so far. Suboptimal behaviours persist despite
the existence of knowledge and this means that the psychological basis for
sticking to existing practice to the detriment of truth and efficiency must
be examined. ‘Conservation is as much a people-focussed enterprise as a
material focussed one’ yet, as a profession, we have not developed our
ability to study the people as well as we have the study of materials.55 It
is a suboptimal feature of conservation that the distribution of research
effort between technical and psychological questions is not in proportion
to our need to understand both aspects and their bearing on conservation
decisions. Suboptimal behaviours persist because change is difficult and
costly and not because people don’t know that alternatives exist. The impor-
tant lesson from the last 25 years is that to change standards we have to
change attitudes.
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Abstract
Jonathan Ashley-Smith’s ‘Let’s be Honest’ presentation and paper
from the 1994 International Institute for Conservation (IIC) confer-
ence on preventive conservation is the starting point for this article
which considers the evolution of environmental standards to ask
whether it is technological or psychological factors that have initiated
their greatest change. It examines the implications of categorising
types of damage for decision-making and asks whether understand-
ing damage as a process rather than an outcome contributes to a cau-
tionary approach to environmental standards in conservation. The
article considers the possible psychological justifications used by
those advocating standards for collections and asks whether these
may lead to behaviour which is ineffective or ethically compromised.
Challenging questions are then asked of the profession about what it
cannot do, does not understand, and where it fails. The article con-
cludes that although conservation has made progress in understand-
ing materials and their properties to inform the implementation of
environmental standards, it has made significantly less progress in
understanding how and why decision-makers introduce and apply
standards.
Résumé
«Réflexions sur le fondement psychologique conduisant à des pra-
tiques environnementales suboptimales en matière de conservation»
La présentation et l’écrit ‘Soyons honnêtes’de Jonathan Ashley Smith
lors de la conférence de l’Institut International de Conservation (IIC)
en 1994 sur la conservation préventive sont le point de départ de cet
article. Celui-ci examine l’évolution des normes environnementales
afin d’évaluer si ce sont les facteurs technologiques ou psychologi-
ques qui ont initié leur plus grandeévolution. Il examine les impli-
cations de la catégorisation des types de dommages dans la prise
de décision et se demande si la compréhension des altérations
comme processus et non commerésultat contribue à une approche
prudente des normes environnementales en matière de conservation.
L’article étudie les justifications psychologiques possibles présentées
par ceux qui préconisent des normes pour les collections et demande
si elles peuvent conduire à un comportement qui est inefficace ou
compromis sur le plan éthique. Des questions délicates sont ensuite
posées à la profession sur ce qu’elle ne peut pas faire, ne comprend
pas et là où elle échoue. L’article conclut que bien que la conservation
ait progressé dans la compréhension des matériaux et de leurs pro-
priétés pour guider la mise enœuvre des normes environnementales,
elle a fait beaucoup moins de progrès pour comprendre comment et
pourquoi les décideurs introduisent et appliquent les normes.
Zusammenfassung
„Reflektionen über die psychologische Basis suboptimaler Praktiken
im Kontext von Umgebungsbedingungen in der Restaurierung“
Jonathan Ashley Smiths Paper und Präsentation ‘Let’s be Honest’
(Lasst uns ehrlich sein), gegeben auf der IIC (International Institute
of Conservation) Konferenz zur präventiven Konservierung 1994,
ist der Ausgangspunkt diesen Artikels. Er untersucht die Evolution
der Klimastandards vor der Hintergrundfrage, ob es technologische
oder psychologische Faktoren sind, die die größten Veränderungen
bewirkt haben. Er untersucht auch die Implikationen einer Kategor-
isierung von Schadensarten für eine Entscheidungsfindung und hin-
terfragt, ob das Verständnis der Schäden eher als ein Prozess und
weniger als ein Resultat zu einem konservativeren Zugang zu Kli-
mastandards in der Restaurierung führt. Der Artikel beleuchtet die
335b-421d-a5a6-9ca194fa6b80 (accessed
28 November 2017).
55 Mary Jo Lelyveld, AICCM 2017 con-
ference Twitter feed, 31 October 2017,
https://twitter.com/AICCM_OZ/status/
925488502522839040 (accessed 6 Decem-
ber 2017).
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möglichen psychologischen Rechtfertigungen, die von denjenigen
eingesetzt werden, die die Standards für Sammlungen festlegen
und überlegt, ob diese zu ineffektivem oder ethisch fragwürdigem
Verhalten führen. Schließlich werden herausfordernde Fragen an
den Berufsstand gestellt: was kann er nicht, was versteht er nicht
und wo hat er versagt? Als Fazit stellt der Artikel dar, dass,
obwohl Fortschritte im Materialverständnis und dessen Einfluss
auf Klimabedingungen gemacht worden sind, viel weniger For-
tschritt dabei gemacht worden ist nachzuvollziehen, wie und
warum Entscheidungsträger Standards einführen und anwenden.
Resumen
“Reflexiones sobre los fundamentos psicológicos aplicados a prácti-
cas ambientales no óptimas en conservación”
Este artículo parte de la presentación y del documento sobre conser-
vación preventiva ‘Seamos honestos’de Jonathan Ashley Smith en la
conferencia de 1994 del Instituto Internacional para la Conservación
(IIC). En este documento el autor examina la evolución de los están-
dares ambientales y cuestiona si los mayores cambios han sido inicia-
dos por factores tecnológicos o psicológicos. Considera las
consecuencias de tomar decisiones basadas en la categorización de
tipos de daños y pregunta si entender el daño como un proceso en
lugar de un resultado contribuye a un enfoque preventivo de los
estándares ambientales en conservación. Este artículo considera las
posibles justificaciones psicológicas utilizadas por quienes defienden
estándares aplicados a las colecciones y pregunta si estos podrían
propiciar una conducta ineficaz o éticamente comprometida. El
articulo continúa haciendo preguntas difíciles a la profesión sobre
lo que no puede hacer, lo que no entiende y dónde falla. Se concluye
que aunque la conservación ha avanzado en el conocimiento de
materiales y sus propiedades para informar la aplicación de están-
dares ambientales, se ha progresado significativamente menos en la
comprensión de cómo y por qué los responsables de tomar decisiones
introducen y aplican estándares.
摘要
“关于保存修复领域中不理想的环境实践之心理基础的思考”
作者以乔纳森·阿什利·史密斯（Jonathan Ashley Smith）在1994年国
际文 物修护学会（IIC）预防性保护会议上发表的“让我们坦诚”的演
讲和论文作为出发点，探讨引发环境标准演变上的巨大变化是否因
技术或心理因素所致。作者思考了为做决策而划分了不同损害类型
的影响，并探讨了在保存修复上将损害理解为一个过程而不是结果
是否有助于警示性环境标准的形成。作者考虑了那些提倡藏品标准
的人可能会采用的心理辩护，并探讨了这种心理是否会导致无效行
为或道德上的妥协。作者还向专业人士求助关于“什么不能做”、“不
明白”和“哪里有欠缺”等挑战性问题。文章最后总结道，尽管在保存
修复领域人们为环境标准的实施在材料及其属性的了解方面取得了
进展，但是在理解决策者引入和应用标准的方式和原因上的进展却
很少。
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